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ABSTRACT: 4 
Several studies have been using quantified consensus within climate science as an argument to 5 
foster climate policy. Recent efforts to communicate such scientific consensus attained a high 6 
public profile but it is doubtful if they can be regarded successful. We argue that repeated efforts to 7 
shore up the scientific consensus on minimalist claims such as ‘humans cause global warming’ are 8 
distractions from more urgent matters of knowledge, values, policy framing and public 9 
engagement.  Such efforts to force policy progress through communicating scientific consensus 10 
misunderstand the relationship between scientific knowledge, publics and policymakers. More 11 
important is to focus on genuinely controversial issues within climate policy debates where 12 
expertise might play a facilitating role. Mobilising expertise in policy debates calls for judgment, 13 
context and attention to diversity, rather than deferring to formal quantifications of narrowly 14 
scientific claims.  15 
 16 
INTRODUCTION 17 
Quantification of consensus within climate science continues to occupy a central role in public 18 
discussions of climate change, with a particular focus on the level of agreement regarding the 19 
anthropogenic contribution to global temperature rise. Since 2004, a series of papers have addressed 20 
this issue (Oreskes, 2004; Anderegg et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Verheggen et al., 2014). One of 21 
these (Cook et al., 2013) (C13) has gained particular prominence with the claim that 97.1% of those 22 
papers expressing a position on anthropogenic global warming either explicitly states or implies that 23 
humans cause warming. The claim has had significant media impact (Skeptical Science, 2014), 24 
 2 
inspired a popular television comedy programme (Kelly, 2014), been adjudged Environmental 1 
Research Letters’ best article for 2013 (Kammen, 2013), and even been tweeted by President 2 
Obama (Obama, 2013) (albeit embellishing C13’s original claim with the word ‘dangerous’). 3 
Consensus quantification is justified by arguing that public ignorance of consensus amongst climate 4 
scientists provides a barrier to the implementation of climate change mitigation policy (Oreskes, 5 
2004; Anderegg et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2013; Verheggen et al., 2014). Here, we argue that 6 
focusing on consensus amongst experts as a route to policy progress misunderstands the role of 7 
scientific knowledge in public affairs and policymaking. Drawing on examples from the extensive 8 
science and technology studies (STS) literature, we show that building the basis for policy action 9 
cannot be done simply with appeals to fact. Where these facts are complex and negotiated, as in the 10 
case of climate change, experts and policymakers need to acknowledge and engage more actively 11 
with public ‘matters of concern’ (Latour, 2004). 12 
SCIENCE 13 
Nowhere is the social negotiation of fact clearer than in the case of C13 itself. The publication of 14 
the article prompted a long-running and robust debate on blogs (e.g. …and Then There’s Physics, 15 
2014; Pile, 2013; Nuccitelli, 2013; Hulme, 2014), within the pages of scientific journals (Tol, 2014; 16 
2016; Cook et al., 2014; Cook & Cowtan, 2015; Duarte, 2014) and even in the US Congress 17 
(Vaidyanathan, 2014).  One focus of discussion has been the high proportion of abstracts in C13 18 
without a position, when compared with the previous consensus study conducted by Oreskes 19 
(2004). Both studies rate abstracts, ‘but where Oreskes finds 75% agreement and 25% no position, 20 
Cook has 33% agreement, 66% no position and 1% disagreement.’ (Tol, 2016). In fact, C13 re-21 
analysed the sample used by Oreskes based on their methodology. They found a wide discrepancy: 22 
‘Of the ... 894 [papers], none rejected the consensus, consistent with Oreskes’ result. Oreskes 23 
determined that 75% of papers endorsed the consensus, based on the assumption that mitigation and 24 
 3 
impact papers implicitly endorse the consensus. By comparison, we found that 28% of the 894 1 
abstracts endorsed AGW while 72% expressed no position.’ (Cook et al., 2013). 2 
 3 
We do not wish to adjudicate on this disagreement here. Rather, these arguments demonstrate the 4 
pitfalls of attempting to quantify consensus in the scientific literature in the manner of C13 in order 5 
to produce ‘proof’ for persuading the public. Rather than securing certainty that was absent before, 6 
this exercise has invited intense scrutiny to the judgments underpinning their claim, and generated 7 
further doubt. This was a predictable outcome on the basis of STS studies which show that doing 8 
more research on politically controversial, high-stakes policy matters typically increases uncertainty 9 
(Collingridge & Reeve, 1986). This happens as different parties are motivated to undercut each 10 
other’s claims, and the complexity of scientific judgment lends itself to generating endless 11 
disagreement on technical grounds (Sarewitz, 2004). Contributing to public debate and policy 12 
therefore calls for a more cosmopolitan approach to climate knowledge where the limits of 13 
scientific resolution to intractable disputes are acknowledged and efforts made to communicate and 14 
engage with the implications of different positions, not all derived from science (Beck, 2012). This 15 
brings us to the rationale for consensus quantification, not only as a means of communication 16 
within the scientific community, but also as a means of public communication and persuasion.   17 
 18 
PUBLICS 19 
The argument for quantifying the scientific consensus on climate change is often made in terms of 20 
better informing a misinformed public. For example, proponents use opinion poll evidence to argue 21 
that there is a "significant gap between public perceptions and reality, with 57% of the US public 22 
either disagreeing or unaware that scientists overwhelmingly agree that the earth is warming due to 23 
human activity" (Cook et al., 2013, p. 6), and that this misperception is a result of misinformation 24 
 4 
spread by opponents of climate policies (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Since the public seems 1 
unaware that such a science consensus exists, consensus communicators seek to publicize its 2 
existence.  Following experimental evidence from psychology, this gap is believed to be associated 3 
with reduced support for a range of climate policies (Ding et al., 2011) and that this gap can be 4 
closed by providing effective information regarding the extent of consensus within climate science 5 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2013). However, these experimental findings have been challenged in two 6 
ways in the literature. First, if increasing (consensual) scientific knowledge merely accentuates the 7 
cultural “conflict of interest” within some individuals (Kahan et al., 2012), then climate science 8 
knowledge need not be the only basis upon which climate-friendly policies can be advocated. 9 
Second, if one treats the history of research and public communication of climate consensus as a 10 
natural experiment, then the persistence of the ‘consensus gap’ suggests consensus messaging has 11 
limited efficacy (Kahan, 2015). A more recent study acknowledges the influence of political 12 
ideology and cultural values in shaping attitudes about climate, but still argues that ‘the positive 13 
effect of climate information (or conversely, the negative effect of misinformation) still plays a 14 
significant role in influencing climate literacy levels’ (Cook, 2016, p. 5).  15 
Here, consensus messaging is argued to be important because even people with left-liberal views do 16 
not know the correct level of scientific consensus.  It is also argued that it is important to refute 17 
misinformation, since this is the mechanism through which beneficial framings and correct 18 
information about climate are being ‘neutralized’ (2016, p. 13). The scholarly debate about 19 
consensus messaging is intense but based on a relatively small pool of researchers and published 20 
papers. Debates within psychology, and broader debates about the usefulness of laboratory studies 21 
in assessing efficacy present a picture of an emerging field of study that has yet to reach a 22 
‘consensus on consensus’. 23 
 24 
 5 
Even if one were to identify the precise effect of consensus messaging as a variable in climate 1 
communication, the fact remains that in many fields of climate change research scientific consensus 2 
is elusive. Scientific consensus exists among some relevant, small communities (for example, 3 
attribution studies leading to affirm AGW), but there are many fields relevant to climate change 4 
impacts where such a consensus does not hold. For example, the IPCC reported in its Fifth 5 
Assessment Report that “[n]o best estimate for equilibrium climate sensitivity can now be given 6 
because of a lack of agreement on values across assessed lines of evidence and studies” (IPCC, 7 
2013, p. 16). Regarding increases in North Atlantic tropical cyclone activity “[t]here remains 8 
substantial disagreement on the relative importance of internal variability, GHG forcing and 9 
aerosols for this observed trend” (IPCC, 2013, p. 914). Since the release of the Fifth Assessment 10 
Report, diverse views have been published in the academic literature regarding the existence or 11 
otherwise of a slowdown in global surface warming (Karl et al., 2015; Fyfe et al., 2016).  12 
 13 
Acknowledging scientific dissensus in these matters is not the same as rejecting climate change as a 14 
global policy problem. What this does demonstrate, however, is that in the complex, multifaceted 15 
realm of climate science, relying on scientific consensus to cauterise public debate is a self-16 
defeating strategy. Climate science is complex and findings often contradictory and, most 17 
importantly, does not tell us anything about what to do about climate change. Consensus-seeking is 18 
neither a social requisite nor a normative ideal for a viable democracy (Rescher, 1993); 19 
acknowledging and valuing dissensus would allow a more publicly inclusive and accessible debate 20 
over approaches to climate change that do not prematurely foreclose particular policy options 21 
(Machin, 2013). Attempts to remove political conflict from climate change have proved to be a 22 
dead end, part of a troubling wider trend towards depoliticising key policy issues (Hay, 2007) and 23 
which is now being called into question in an ongoing ‘populist’ backlash.    24 
 6 
  1 
 2 
The focus on quantifying scientific consensus as a way of trying to settle controversy or persuade 3 
the public to support specific policies reveals an unquestioned faith in a particular repertoire for 4 
producing, validating and using knowledge, what scholars in science and technology studies call 5 
‘civic epistemology’ (Jasanoff, 2011; Miller, 2005). Consensus quantification is just one way of 6 
trying to resolve epistemic conflicts into useful evidence. Traditionally favoured in US 7 
environmental risk assessment, this approach has sometimes had the opposite effect of exacerbating 8 
controversy. For example, the attempt to identify and regulate potential carcinogens such as 9 
formaldehyde has foundered in an American regulatory system that demands quantified evidence of 10 
hazard and encourages adversarial scrutiny and endless deconstruction of competing evidentiary 11 
claims (Jasanoff, 1986).  12 
 13 
Quantification may well work in specific times and cultures as a way of making the unseen visible 14 
or of holding governments to account, or indeed, as a symbol around which a particular community 15 
coalesces. In this way, the ‘97% consensus’ may be a number around which those already 16 
committed to climate change action who are inclined to trust climate scientists can rally (Corner & 17 
Roberts, 2014), rather than one which can be persuasive for other groups in political discussion 18 
(Kahan et al., 2011). Groups who are not persuaded by appeals to scientific authority as a 19 
justification for policy might (rationally) seek to question whether such science is ‘sound’ 20 
(Demeritt, 2001), placing climate science under stresses it is ill-equipped to bear (Pearce et al., 21 
2015). Fundamentally, no set of calculations about epistemic consensus can help to tie people 22 
together in the absence of other social connections (Miller, 2005). For example, research in political 23 
psychology emphasises the importance of morality and values in binding together societal groups 24 
 7 
(Haidt, 2012; Lakoff, 2002) and in religious studies the role of cosmology and cultural identity 1 
(Wilson & Steger, 2013)  2 
 3 
POLICYMAKERS 4 
Even if one puts to one side the non-scientific characteristics of public communication, it is unwise 5 
to assume that closing the consensus gap will influence public policy. We present two reasons here. 6 
First, the literature on science and policy shows that the level of scientific agreement about an issue 7 
often has little influence on policy action. For example, before the Montreal negotiations to regulate 8 
chlorofluorocarbons, expectations for an ambitious treaty were low despite claims of a science 9 
consensus about long-term ozone depletion (Grundmann, 2001). However, the picture changed just 10 
prior to the negotiations with the discovery of the Antarctic ‘ozone hole’, a dramatic crisis signal 11 
that was in itself completely unexpected. Thus, the subsequent political agreement of the Montreal 12 
Protocol to regulate chlorofluorocarbons was more the result of the unexplained phenomenon of the 13 
‘ozone hole’ prompting ozone depletion to be a matter of concern than any coalescing of scientific 14 
consensus. Influential narratives about the genesis of the Montreal Protocol maintain that not only 15 
was the process science driven, but that there was a scientific consensus that led to the political 16 
agreement (see Haas, 1992; Tolba, 2008). In fact, the process was driven by changing political 17 
constellations, mainly a U-turn of big chemical companies and the European Community, 18 
accompanied by the hot crisis signal of the ‘ozone hole’ (for details, see Benedick, 1998; 19 
Grundmann, 2001). If anything moved policy towards the agreement in Montreal it was the 20 
discovery of the ozone hole, not the agreement among atmospheric scientists about future ozone 21 
losses. 22 
 23 
 8 
Second, an undue focus on scientific consensus brings about missteps in policy. By narrowing the 1 
terms of political debate about the desirability of this or that (or indeed any) climate policy to the 2 
physical sciences, scientific facts are used to substitute for matters of public concern. Legitimate 3 
and necessary public argument about whether a fact matters, and why, is short-circuited. Debates 4 
about the value of carbon emissions reductions are divorced from their social and political contexts 5 
(Cohen et al., 1998). For example, Pearce (2014) demonstrates how scientific consensus constitutes 6 
poor evidence for policy in the absence of compelling ideas and arguments, while Twyman et al. 7 
(2015) contrast the universal meaning of carbon as a scientific element with its complex local 8 
meanings within communities of the global South. In short, scientific consensus does not 9 
necessarily beget policy progress. Equally, policy progress is not necessarily dependent on 10 
acceptance of scientific consensus. The US nominee for Secretary of Energy, Governor Rick Perry, 11 
does not accept the consensus enumerated in the literature, yet still made Texas into “the nation’s 12 
leading generator of wind power, a renewable technology that he promoted heavily during his 14 13 
years in office” (Mervis, 2016). Also in the U.S., the Green Tea Party, a coalition of grassroots 14 
conservatives who have allied with environmentalists, predicates support for decentralised, solar 15 
energy primarily as an expression of libertarian values rather than as a means of reducing carbon 16 
emissions, enabling it to sidestep the cultural polarisation that exists around belief in human-caused 17 
climate change (Kormann, 2015). Research in the UK also emphasises the potential for concepts of 18 
patriotism and conservation as a means of building coalitions of support for climate policy with 19 
conservatives in the UK (Whitmarsh and Corner, 2017). 20 
 21 
While these examples demonstrate that the relationship between science and policy is not linear, we 22 
emphasise that scientific advice to policymakers remains a crucial element of democracy 23 
(Gluckman & Wilsdon, 2016). However, important and controversial issues within climate change, 24 
 9 
such as the effect of GHGs and aerosols on monsoonal weather systems and the likelihood of ice-1 
shelf collapse may not easily lend themselves to quantifiable claims of scientific consensus. Merely 2 
emphasising the strength of a narrowly drawn epistemic consensus underestimates the challenges of 3 
many of these issues. Expertise can play a role in policy deliberation and public endorsement, but it 4 
requires attention to judgment, context and diversity. What makes knowledge useful for policy is 5 
the ability to identify levers for action and an appreciation of how scientific advice will be 6 
interpreted and used in policy processes (Grundmann & Stehr, 2012; Geden, 2016). Engaging with 7 
this question of action inevitably means acknowledging different values and pathways forward. 8 
This opens up questions about the social dimensions of successful policy-making, beyond fantasies 9 
of technocratic solutions.  10 
 11 
For political action on climate change, the messier work of engaging diverse publics across 12 
different scales and with different interests and affiliations is urgently needed (Jasanoff, 2010), 13 
particularly as there is strong evidence that linking climate to local issues is an important factor in 14 
successful policy implementation (Ryan, 2015). Climate change is conventionally framed as a 15 
global problem, causing tension with local policy implementation (Pearce, 2014). Thus, 16 
policymakers must often focus on other drivers in order to make successful arguments for policy; 17 
for example, improving local air quality or public transport (Ryan, 2015). In the absence of such 18 
connections, efforts to quantify scientific consensus about an abstract global process come across as 19 
strategies to close down political debate rather than ‘moving it on’. Defining the central problem in 20 
terms of reducing carbon emissions has allowed technical fixes such as geo-engineering and low-21 
carbon energy to take centre-stage at the expense of a host of wider visions for social, economic and 22 
political change. We do not want to endorse any one of these, but merely wish to call attention to 23 
the many such visions of transformative innovation being put forward (Leach et al., 2012), and that 24 
 10 
debating these does not need to wait until a narrow scientifically-defined consensus has been 1 
achieved.  2 
 3 
BEYOND COUNTING CONSENSUS 4 
We have highlighted the limited public and policy value of enumerating consensus within climate 5 
science. A fundamental point is that, while knowledge and concerns about anthropogenic climate 6 
change have emerged mainly from scientific enquiry, responding to climate change is a deeply 7 
political process. Social media provide one means of studying the political life of climate change. 8 
For example, the publication of the 2014 IPCC report on the physical science of climate change 9 
prompted exchanges on social media that extended into political aspects of climate change such as 10 
the media’s role in publicising climate change, the politics of climate change within certain nation 11 
states, and activism around fracking (Pearce et al., 2014). This attachment of new public meanings 12 
to a scientific report opens a window into the politics of dissensus, rather than of consensus, which 13 
is critical to understand and engage with if widespread support for policy measures is to be gained. 14 
Climate change is a political challenge where establishing facts such as ‘humans cause climate 15 
change’ is largely irrelevant to the more important task of establishing which facts matter, to whom 16 
and why (Jasanoff, 2010). 17 
 18 
One implication for research arising from our argument is to better understand the forms and 19 
conditions of knowledge which ‘open-up’ spaces for constructive policy innovation and 20 
deliberation (Stirling, 2010). Centering on consensus about climate science in public debates does 21 
little to resolve the most pressing questions in climate policy design and implementation.  Instead, it 22 
distracts attention away from important practical challenges that highlight the need to negotiate 23 
between different scales of concern and action rather than box them into a linear relationship 24 
 11 
between scientific consensus and political action. These challenges include the need to: i) attend to, 1 
and work with, different local meanings of climate and climate change (Hulme, 2017) and their 2 
relationship to human institutions and behaviour (Jasanoff, 2010); ii) negotiate between concerns 3 
about the planet as a whole and local expressions of development rights and responsibilities 4 
(Jasanoff & Martello, 2004); and iii) find more inclusive ways of fostering innovation in cleaner 5 
energy technologies and selecting appropriate levels of investment in climate adaptation. These 6 
challenges may also represent opportunities to connect apparently disparate issues, human values 7 
and policy objectives in productive ways. But this requires developing skills in expert judgment 8 
across multiple spaces of science, political and public discussion (Hoppe, 2011; Raman, 2014) 9 
rather than a focus on scientific consensus. At some point, political questions will necessarily be 10 
closed down, at least temporarily, when policy decisions are taken. We argue that the legitimacy of 11 
such a closing down is achieved through a process of engaging with dissent on alternative policy 12 
pathways, and indeed, actively creating the conditions for a more diverse range of possibilities to be 13 
explored where these are not already apparent.  14 
 15 
CONCLUSION 16 
In this commentary, we have argued that repeated efforts to shore up the scientific consensus on 17 
minimalist claims such as ‘humans cause global warming’ are distractions from the more urgent 18 
matters of knowledge, values, policy framing and public engagement.  We maintain that researchers 19 
concerned about the relationship of knowledge to policy would be better advised to invest their 20 
efforts in these areas rather than in exercises of quantifying consensus about tightly drawn 21 
statements of scientific fact. This lesson goes beyond climate change and should be acknowledged 22 
by those hoping that communicating scientific consensus can defuse other environmental 23 
controversies, such as around genetically modified organisms (e.g., Lynas, 2016). In short, we need 24 
 12 
the skills for developing and deploying expert judgment in practical contexts, rather than 1 
quantitative techniques for capturing consensus in climate science and then using such metrics as a 2 
rhetorical driver of climate policy.  3 
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